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INTRODUCTION 
Search engines are the gatekeepers of online information.  They can 
direct users toward particular websites by prominently listing the websites 
on the first page of a user’s search results.  They can also direct users away 
from other websites by hiding them in the last few pages of a user’s search 
results.  They can hide online content from users, either because they do 
not think the website content is relevant, or because they want to hide their 
competitor’s content.  For example, Google has the power to return the 
Zagat
1
 website as the first result in response to a search for “restaurant 
reviews” and Yelp as the last, not because it views Yelp as less relevant, 
but merely because it views Yelp as a threat to Zagat’s success. 
This practice, frequently referred to as “search engine manipulation,”
2
 
subjected Google to an almost two-year investigation by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC). The FTC finally concluded the investigation in 
January of 2013.
3
  The investigation was in large part prompted by pressure 
the FTC faced from legal scholars and Google’s top competitors, primarily 
Microsoft.
4
  These critics argued that Google engaged in anticompetitive 
practices by unfairly prioritizing its own proprietary services and products 
over its competitors’ when displaying search results.
5
  Recognizing the 
significance of the matter, the FTC hired prominent outside counsel Beth 
Wilkinson, a former federal prosecutor and a current partner at Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, to lead the investigation.
6
  Google, of course, 
 
 1. Zagat was acquired by Google in 2011.  Adam Mazmanian, Google Flying High in 
Travel with Frommer’s, NAT’L J. (Aug. 14, 2012, 1:47 PM), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/google-flying-high-in-travel-with-frommer-s-
20120814. 
 2. This practice may also be referred to as “search engine bias.”  The two terms are 
interchangeable. 
 3. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Agrees to Change Its Business 
Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns In the Markets for Devices Like Smart 
Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter FTC Press 
Release], available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm (discussing the close of the 
investigation into anti-competitive practices of Google’s search engine and Google’s 
agreement to change its business practices). 
 4.  See Brent Kendall et al., Behind Google’s Antitrust Escape, WALL ST. J. ONLINE 
(Jan. 5, 2013, 2:10 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323689604578221971197494496.html 
(nothing that “Microsoft had pressed regulators to bring an antitrust case against Google”). 
 5. Id.  There is not yet any proof, however, that Google actively lowers the PageRanks 
of its competitors’ websites. 
 6. David Streitfeld & Edward Wyatt, U.S. Is Escalating Inquiry Studying Google’s 
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2012, at A1. 
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went to great lengths to defend its search engine practices, hiring First 
Amendment expert and law professor Eugene Volokh to draft a white paper 
defending Google search results primarily on First Amendment grounds.
7
 
The primary legal issue concerning Google search optimization is 
whether Google violates federal antitrust laws by prioritizing the websites 
of its own products and services over websites of its competitors, and, if it 
does, what is the proper legal remedy? This issue raises serious 
constitutional issues, since search results could plausibly be considered 
“speech” for First Amendment purposes. 
In this Comment, I argue that, even assuming that Google prioritizes 
its own websites in search results, this practice does not violate federal 
antitrust laws.  Furthermore, any attempt to regulate the ranking of Google 
search results would violate Google’s First Amendment freedom of speech.  
In Part I, I provide a primer on Google search engine results and focus on 
two of Google’s most notable innovations: (1) PageRank, the system by 
which Google determines the relevance of a website which, in turn, 
determines the ranking in which websites appear in a particular search 
query; and (2) Google OneBox, which provides users with immediate 
responses to search queries at the top of a results page.  Critics argue that 
PageRank and Google OneBox are examples of how Google unfairly 
biases its search results, hurting both competitors and consumers.
8
  In Part 
II, I discuss the problem of search engine bias and Google’s recent FTC 
settlement regarding its search engine practices.  I proceed to discuss the 
antitrust objection to Google search in Part III and make two points.  First, 
the goals of antitrust law are not fulfilled when applied to markets that 
provide free goods or services, such as search engines.  Second, even if a 
claim were brought against Google under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the 
claim would fail because neither the “relevant market” nor the “willful 
acquisition” elements of such a claim could be satisfied.  I move on to the 
First Amendment freedom of speech issue in Part IV and examine ways in 
which the First Amendment has been raised as a defense of Google search 
engine practices in three major cases: (1) Search King, Inc. v. Google 
Tech., Inc.;
9
 (2) Langdon v. Google, Inc.;
10
 and (3) KinderStart.com LLC v. 
 
 7. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search 
Engine Results (Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf.  Though technically a white 
paper, Professor Volokh’s paper resembled a legal brief in structure. 
 8. See, e.g., Adam Raff, Search but You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at 
A27 (arguing that Google’s preferential placement of its own vertical search engine results 
at the top of a search engine results page as opposed to competing vertical search engine 
results is what has allowed Google to wipe out its competition “virtually overnight”). 
 9.  No. CIV-02-1457-M (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
 10. 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007). 
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Google, Inc.
11
  I also discuss the “transmission theory” response to First 
Amendment defenses of Google search engine rights, and argue that this 
theory ultimately fails to support a denial of First Amendment rights to 
search engine results.  In Part V, I suggest that Google and its supporters 
have been improperly characterizing what constitutes Google “speech” for 
First Amendment purposes, and I conclude by proposing a new way of 
interpreting Google “speech.”  I argue that this new interpretation would 
allow Google to claim First Amendment protection for its search engine 
results, thereby dodging current proposals for government regulation and 
escaping liability for antitrust allegations, as well as other state-law claims 
it faces in court. 
I. A PRIMER ON GOOGLE SEARCH 
One of the reasons Google has been so successful is because it has 
constantly innovated the search engine industry.
12
  These innovations, 
however, have proven to be double-edged swords.  On the one hand, they 
have revolutionized the way we think about searching the Internet and have 
allowed users to find relevant results more easily.  On the other hand, they 
have subjected Google to immense litigation and even brought it under the 
close monitoring of the FTC.
13
  Scholars and competitors have consistently 
objected to these innovations as violations of federal antitrust law.
14
  This 
section will provide a primer on two of Google’s most notable, yet 
controversial, innovations:  PageRank and Google OneBox. 
A. PageRank 
In order to deliver relevant search results to its users, Google uses 
algorithms to determine which websites will be displayed in response to a 
user’s search queries and in what order those websites will appear.
15
  
Google algorithms rely on over two hundred signals, such as the frequency 
with which the search terms occur on the website, whether the search terms 
 
 11. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006). 
 12. For a list of some of Google’s most notable innovations in the search engine 
industry, see infra text accompanying notes 71-77. 
 13. The FTC investigated Google search engine practices for almost two years before 
finally settling in January 2013.  See FTC Press Release, supra note 3 (discussing the FTC 
investigation). 
 14. See, e.g., id. (illustrating competitors’ objections, primarily Microsoft’s, to Google’s 
search engine practices); Raff, supra note 8 (criticizing Google as being anti-competitive by 
promoting its own products in search engine results). 
 15. Facts About Google and Competition, GOOGLE, 
www.google.com/competition/howgooglesearchworks.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) 
[hereinafter Facts About Google and Competition]. 
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appear in the title, and whether synonyms of the search terms appear on the 
page.
16
  Google’s most famous algorithm is PageRank, named after Larry 
Page—co-founder and CEO of Google.
17
 
PageRank helps determine the relative importance of a website, which 
then determines where in a search engine results page (SERP) the website 
will appear.
18
  To determine the PageRank of a website, Google accounts 
for various factors, such as title tag,
19
 keywords, and the number and 
importance of links pointing to a website.
20
  Using these factors, PageRank 
ranks the “relevance” of a website on a scale from one through ten, with ten 
being the most relevant.
21
  In short, the higher the PageRank of a website, 
the more prominently the website is displayed in search results.  Websites 
with the highest PageRank will appear at the top of a SERP, whereas 
websites with the lowest PageRank will appear on the last of several 
SERPs, or will sometimes not appear at all.  PageRank counts the number 
and quality of links to a page in order to determine the importance of a 
website.
22
  The theory behind PageRank is that if Page A links to Page B, 
then Page A’s link indicates that Page B is a relevant page.
23
  Thus, the 
more frequently other websites link to a page, the higher that page’s 
PageRank will be.  Although Google sells advertisement placement, it does 
not sell PageRank.
24
  In other words, a website cannot pay Google to 
increase its PageRank or to decrease the PageRank of other websites. 
Many critics accuse Google of manipulating its search results to 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. For an excellent primer on PageRank, see CHRIS RIDINGS & MIKE SHISHIGIN, 
PAGERANK UNCOVERED (Jill Whalen & Yuri Baranov eds., 3d ed. 2002), available at 
http://www.voelspriet2.nl/PageRank.pdf.  For Google’s own explanation of its search 
results, see Facts About Google and Competition, supra note 15. 
 19. “Title tag” is a hidden HTML code on a website and is considered to be one of the 
most important factors in achieving high search engine rankings.  The title tag of a webpage 
appears at the top of the browser toolbar when the page is loaded and is also displayed in 
search-engine results.  Additionally, the title page code provides a title for the page when it 
is added to a user’s “favorites.”  For more information on title tags, see James A. Ross, 
Protection for Trademark Owners: The Ultimate System of Regulating Search Engine 
Results, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 295, 314-15 (2002). 
 20. RIDINGS & SHISHIGIN, supra note 18, at 3. 
 21. On rare occasions, a website can receive a PageRank of zero.  See, e.g., KinderStart 
I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 20–21 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (discussing the plaintiff’s 
claim against Google arguing, inter alia, that his website’s PageRank score of “zero” 
constituted defamation). 
 22. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, slip op. at 2 (W.D. 
Okla. May 27, 2003) (“The PageRank is derived from a combination of factors that include 
text-matching and the number of links from other web sites that point to the PageRanked 
web site.”). 
 23. RIDINGS & SHISHIGIN, supra note 18, at 3. 
 24. Search King, Inc., slip op. at 2. 
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benefit its own products and services, and these criticisms usually target 
PageRank.
25
  For example, as of October 28, 2013, a Google search for 
“maps” produces Google Maps as its first search result.  Critics argue that 
Google unfairly prioritizes its own products and services, such as Google 
Maps, over the products and services of its competitors, such as MapQuest 
and Bing Maps, by listing its own services first.
26
  The critics argue that this 
practice deceives the public into believing that Google’s products and 
services are objectively more relevant and therefore superior, driving 
Google’s competitors out of business.
27
  On the other hand, Google 
counters that search manipulation allows Google to deliver more relevant 
results, and it denies unfairly prioritizing its own products over others’.
28
 
Google is not alone in this regard.  Most search engines are guilty of 
search engine manipulation,
29
 since it is through this manipulation that 
search engines are able to produce relevant results.
30
  In lawsuits 
challenging search engine manipulation, plaintiffs often seek search engine 
algorithms during discovery, but such algorithms usually are protected as 
trade secrets.
31
 
 
 25. See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, 
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1183-84 
(arguing that if Google assigned a higher PageRank to all YouTube videos than those on 
any competitor websites, such as MySpace or Veoh, users unaware of the Google-YouTube 
merger could believe that YouTube videos earned high rankings because of their relevance, 
rather than because Google was promoting its own product). 
 26. Id.  Interestingly enough, however, a Google search for “email,” as of October 28, 
2013, produces Yahoo! e-mail as the first search result.  Google’s own e-mail service, 
Gmail, only appears after Yahoo! as the third search result.  Perhaps even more interesting 
is a Google search for “search engine.”  As of October 28, 2013, the first search result is a 
Wikipedia entry and the second result is Dogpile.  Google.com does not even appear on the 
first page of search results. 
 27. See supra text accompanying notes 8 and 25. 
 28. Facts About Google and Competition, supra note 15 (boasting that Google search 
algorithms are “designed to improve the user experience by catching and demoting low-
quality sites that [do] not provide useful original content or otherwise add much value . . . 
[and providing] better rankings for high-quality sites . . . .”).  Scholars also argue that 
Google manipulation of its search results is beneficial because it creates more personalized 
searches that produce more relevant results.  See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias 
and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188 (2006) (discussing 
the benefits of Google search engine manipulation and the consequences of government 
regulation of search engine results). 
 29. For more background information on search engine bias, see Bracha & Pasquale, 
supra note 25, at 1167-71. 
 30. Goldman, supra note 28, at 189 (arguing that all search engine results are biased). 
 31. Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 201, 233 (2006) (“[A]lgorithms of search engines are generally trade 
secrets . . . .”). 
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B. Google OneBox 
Google OneBox is one of Google’s more innovative improvements to 
the search engine industry.  In response to a search query, Google will 
often list a direct response to entered search terms at the very top of a 
SERP, as opposed to the traditional list of blue hyperlinks.
32
  Google 
OneBox comes in many forms and is best explained through illustrations.  
For example, when I enter “map of New York” into the Google search bar, 
a map of New York powered by Google Maps appears at the very top of 
my search results.
33
  That map is an example of a Google OneBox result.
34
  
When I click on the map, I am directed to Google Maps, where a map of 
New York appears with options to search for directions or nearby 
restaurants.
35
  When I enter a ticker symbol into the Google search bar, 
such as “aapl,” I see live quotes and information from Google Finance 
relating to Apple stock.
36
  That box of stock information is an example of a 
Google OneBox result.  Google OneBox differs from general search results 
because it provides a direct response to a search query, as opposed to a 
simple hyperlink that one must click to then find a response to a search 
query. 
However, Google OneBox should not be confused with the 
“Knowledge Panel,” another one of Google’s search innovations.  The 
Knowledge Panel differs from Google OneBox because the Knowledge 
Panel contains fragments of content scraped from other websites, such as 
Wikipedia or IMDB.  For example, when I enter the movie title “My 
Cousin Vinny” into the Google search bar, images from the movie along 
with general information about the movie appear in a box on the right-hand 
side of the screen.
37
  That box of images and general information is an 
example of a Knowledge Panel.  Google simply compiles this content into 
a box, known as the Knowledge Panel.
38
  Google OneBox content, on the 
other hand, is purely produced by Google.  It usually comes in the form of 
 
 32. Google OneBox Results, GOOGLE (July 9, 2006), 
http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2006/07/google-onebox-results.html. 
 33. Search for “map of New York,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (enter “map of 
New York” into the search bar, then click “Google Search”) (last visited Sept. 2, 2013). 
 34.  See supra note 32. 
 35. See GOOGLE, supra note 33. 
 36. Search for “aapl,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (enter “aapl” into the search 
bar, then click “Google Search”) (last visited Sept. 2, 2013). 
 37. Search for “My Cousin Vinny,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (enter “My 
Cousin Vinny” into the search bar, then click “Google Search”) (last visited Sept. 2, 2013). 
 38. For more information on the Knowledge Panel, see Amir Efrati, Google Gives 
Search a Refresh, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2012, at B1.  See also The Knowledge Graph, 
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/features/search/knowledge.html (discussing 
Google’s Knowledge Graph, which is another name for the Knowledge Panel). 
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a direct response to a search query. 
The image below illustrates the difference between Google OneBox 
and the Knowledge Panel by displaying results from a Google search for 
“aapl.”
39
  The box at the top left corner of the image that shows data for 
Apple stock is an example of a Google OneBox result.  This contains data 
taken from one of Google’s own vertical search engines, Google Finance.  
In contrast, the box at the top right-hand corner of the image is an example 
of a Knowledge Panel.  This Knowledge Panel contains data Google has 
scraped from other content on the web, such as the Wikipedia entry for 
Apple Inc. 
 
Google OneBox results often take a user to one of Google’s many 
vertical search engines.  A vertical search engine is a specialized search 
engine that indexes only a specific segment of content on the web.
40
  
Examples of vertical search engines on Google are Google Finance, Google 
Maps, Google News, YouTube, and Google+ Places.  Examples of non-
Google vertical search engines are Yelp, MapQuest, Expedia, and 
Travelocity. 
Although Google OneBox results may seem quite helpful to users, 
critics argue that Google OneBox is an anticompetitive tool that Google 
uses to prioritize its own vertical search products over competing 
products.
41
  For example, when I enter “directions from New York to 
 
 39. GOOGLE, supra note 36. 
 40. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The 
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 202 (2011). 
 41. .See, e.g., Raff, supra note 8 (arguing that Google’s preferential placement of its 
own vertical search engine results at the top of a SERP as opposed to vertical search engine 
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Boston,” a Google Map of the route from New York to Boston appears at 
the very top of the page.
42
  A link to a MapQuest map of the same route 
appears farther down the page, below the Google Map.
43
  Additionally, 
unlike the Google Map, the MapQuest link does not include an image of 
the route.
44
  Thus, most searchers entering these search terms would click 
on the Google Map link of the route as opposed to the MapQuest link, 
because the Google Map link is (1) more prominent and (2) more 
convenient to click on, given that the map is embedded into the actual 
search results page.  Furthermore, since Google advertises that it returns 
more relevant links at the top of a SERP,
45
 a user may believe that since the 
Google Map appears at the top, before the MapQuest map, the Google Map 
must be more “relevant” to their search.  Competitors object that this 
practice drives them out of the market.
46
 
II. THE PROBLEM OF SEARCH ENGINE MANIPULATION 
The best and worst thing about the Internet is the breadth of its 
content.  Search engines provide value by indexing all of the content in a 
way that makes the Internet manageable and useful.  Instead of browsing 
through hundreds of websites to find exactly what is sought, search engines 
allow users to enter search terms that filter out irrelevant content through 
the use of search terms.  The search engine returns only websites relating to 
those search terms.  To do this, however, each search engine must decide 
how to determine what is relevant and what is not.
47
  This necessarily 
involves a ranking of websites the search engine deems relevant and a 
 
results of its competitors is what has allowed Google to wipe out its competition). 
 42. Search for “directions from New York to Boston,” GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com (enter “directions from New York to Boston” into the search bar, 
then click “Google Search”) (last visited Sept. 2, 2013). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Facts About Google and Competition, supra note 15 (“[Google] algorithms attempt 
to rank the most relevant search results towards the top of the page, and less relevant search 
results lower down the page.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Complaint at 3-4, TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 
370 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 1400(SHS)), 2009 WL 455244 [hereinafter TradeComet 
Complaint] (alleging that Google drove the plaintiff out of business by decreasing its 
prominence on Google’s platform because Google viewed the plaintiff as a dangerous 
competitor). 
 47. See, e.g., Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1163-64 (“Search engines play a 
crucial role in managing the enormous amount of information available on the Internet.  
They help users locate the information most relevant and important to them and lead an 
audience (and interlocutors) to content providers.”); Goldman, supra note 28, at 189 
(“[S]earch engines make editorial choices designed to satisfy their audience. These choices 
systematically favor certain types of content over others, producing a phenomenon called 
‘search engine bias.’”). 
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filtering out of websites the search engine deems irrelevant.
48
  In this way, 
search engines have become the gatekeepers of information:  They direct us 
toward what they think is relevant and away from what they do not think is 
relevant. 
A. The Impact On Competitors 
Search engine bias creates significant opportunity for abuse.  Search 
engine operators such as Google and Microsoft have the power to 
manipulate search results in ways that serve their own company’s 
interests.
49
  A search engine’s algorithm can lower the ranking of a website 
simply because the search engine operator views it as competition or 
because it has a personal distaste for the website.
50
  For example, Google 
can give a high PageRank to Zagat, allowing it to appear at the top of a 
SERP, and Google can give a low PageRank to Yelp, pushing Yelp’s 
website down to the bottom of a SERP.  Absent a clear notice to the user, it 
may appear as if websites that are pushed to the bottom of a SERP, like 
Yelp, are less relevant and not worth visiting.
51
  This type of conduct can 
significantly decrease the traffic to that website and has the potential to 
force the website operator to shut down.  One reporter has argued that this 
biased ranking is how Google Maps unseated MapQuest from its 
dominance in online mapping services “virtually overnight.”
52
 
B. The Impact On Consumers 
In addition to the effect search engine bias has on competitors’ 
business, search engine bias also has a significant effect on users.  As the 
gatekeepers of the Internet, search engines are able to control what 
information reaches the user and what does not.  Professors Bracha and 
Pasquale have argued that exercise of this control can significantly 
diminish the autonomy of the search engine’s users.
53
  For example, if a 
 
 48. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1168. 
 49. Id. at 1170 (“[S]earch engines can and, to some extent, do manipulate results in 
order to serve their own self-interest.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Letter from Gary Ruskin, Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert, to Donald Clark, 
Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n (June 27, 2002), at 1, available at 
http://www.commercialalert.org/PDFs/ftcresponse.pdf (explaining receipt of a complaint 
alleging that Google’s search engine bias “may mislead search engine users to believe that 
search results are based on relevancy alone, not marketing ploys”). 
 52. Raff, supra note 8 (“The preferential placement of Google Maps helped it unseat 
MapQuest from its position as America’s leading online mapping service virtually 
overnight.”). 
 53. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1176-77. 
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user enters “same-sex marriage” into a Google search and most of the 
results returned are websites in favor of same-sex marriage, a user might 
believe this means that more people support same-sex marriage than 
oppose it.
54
  If a user enters “do violent video games cause gun violence 
among youth” into a Google search and most of the results returned are 
websites that suggest “yes,” a user might believe this means that violent 
video games do, in fact, cause violence among youth.  By lowering the 
PageRank of these websites, Google has the power to turn users away from 
websites citing studies that suggest “no,” violent video games do not cause 
gun violence among youth.  Manipulating search engine results in the way 
potentially allows search engine operators, like Google, to impact users’ 
beliefs. 
C. The FTC Settlement 
After almost twenty months of investigating Google’s search practices 
for antitrust violations, the FTC issued a press release on January 3, 2013, 
announcing that it had reached a settlement with Google and that the FTC 
would cease its investigation into the company.
55
  After sifting through the 
evidence, the FTC concluded that Google’s search algorithms, “even those 
that may have had the effect of harming individual competitors—could be 
plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product and the 
experience of its users.”
56
  Furthermore, it concluded that condemning 
legitimate product improvements such as those Google made would risk 
harming consumers: 
Challenging Google’s product design decisions in this case 
would require the Commission—or a court—to second-guess a 
firm’s product design decisions where plausible precompetitive 
justifications have been offered, and where those justifications 
are supported by ample evidence.  Based on this evidence, we do 
not find Google’s business practices with respect to the claimed 
search bias to be, on balance, demonstrably 
anticompetitive . . . .
57
 
 
 54. Given the way PageRank has been explained to the public—as prioritizing websites 
that are more frequently linked to over websites less frequently visited—a user could infer 
(accurately or inaccurately) that the top websites on a search engine results page are the 
most frequently visited websites, and may therefore infer that more people are in favor of 
same-sex marriage than opposed to it.  See supra Part I.A (explaining PageRank). 
 55. FTC Press Release, supra note 3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, 
In the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), at 2-3, 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf [hereinafter FTC Statement]. 
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After the settlement, Microsoft and other Google critics exploded and 
labeled the investigation “weak and frankly—unusual.”
58
 
Although it may seem as if Google is safe now that the FTC has ruled 
in its favor, the battle continues.  Critics continue lobbying against Google 
and pressuring the government to take action.
59
  Google remains under 
investigation by several other entities, such as:  the European Union; the 
South Korean Fair Trade Commission; Brazil’s Justice Ministry; and the 
Attorney Generals of Texas, New York, California, Ohio, Mississippi, and 
Oklahoma.
60
  Additionally, private parties have continued to file suit 
against Google for violating state antitrust and consumer protection laws.
61
  
This makes it a more critical time than ever to examine the objections to 
Google’s search practices and proposed solutions to search engine bias. 
III. THE ANTITRUST OBJECTION 
The crux of the FTC investigation into Google was determining 
whether or not Google manipulated its search results in ways that constitute 
anticompetitive conduct in violation of the Sherman Act.
62
  In this section, I 
argue that the goals of antitrust law are not achieved when applied to 
markets that provide free goods or services, such as search engines.  
Additionally, I argue that even if the Sherman Act applies to Google 
searches, Google would escape liability because there is no “relevant 
market” that can be alleged for purposes of the Sherman Act, and Google 
does not “willfully acquiesce” in its monopoly share by engaging in 
anticompetitive conduct.  Rather, Google enjoys an increased market share 
because of a superior product and its numerous innovations in the search 
engine industry.
63
 
 
 58. Dave Heiner, The FTC and Google: A Missed Opportunity, MICROSOFT ON THE 
ISSUES (Jan. 3, 2013, 4:27 P.M.), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/ 
archive/2013/01/03/the-ftc-and-google-a-missed-opportunity.aspx.  Dave Heiner is the Vice 
President and Deputy General Counsel of Microsoft. 
 59. See, e.g., id. (expressing the hope that other antitrust agencies will succeed where 
Heiner believes the FTC has failed, and “obtain the additional relief needed to address the 
serious competition law concerns that remain,” regarding Google’s conduct). 
 60. Global Scrutiny: Law Enforcement Agencies Around the World Are Investigating 
Google, FAIRSEARCH 2 http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/global-
scrutiny.pdf; see also Microsoft Pressures Europe After FTC Google Verdict, CNBC (Jan. 
4, 2013, 10:57 A.M.), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100354398 (summarizing Dave Heiner’s 
criticisms of the FTC’s verdict regarding Google’s alleged antitrust violations, and 
Microsoft’s subsequent focus on the investigations being conducted in Europe). 
 61. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, SMS Telecom LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 6:12-cv-
00987 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2013) (alleging, inter alia, fraud, deceptive trade practices, and 
unfair competition). 
 62. FTC Statement, supra note 57. 
 63. For examples of some of these innovations, see infra text accompanying notes 71-
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A. The Goals of the Federal Antitrust Laws 
The Sherman Act makes it unlawful to monopolize, attempt to 
monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any given market.
64
  It is generally 
accepted that the purpose of antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act is to 
maximize “consumer welfare.”
65
  Monopolies hurt consumer welfare in two 
ways.  First, monopolies drive up prices.
66
  If there is only one seller of a 
product, the seller can increase the price of the product and consumers will 
be forced to pay whatever is demanded (or suffer without the product, 
which is not always an option) because there are no lower priced 
alternatives.  Second, monopolies hurt innovation.
67
  If there is only one 
seller of a product, that seller has little incentive to innovate or to improve 
the product because the seller does not have to worry about a competing 
product. 
Neither of the foregoing reasons supports the application of the 
Sherman Act to Google’s search engine practices.  First, assuming Google 
has a monopoly over the search engine market, there is no harm to 
consumer welfare through an increase of prices, since Google search 
services are free.
68
   
Second, there is no empirical evidence that Google’s domination of 
the search engine market has harmed innovation within that market.
69
  
Monopolies are thought to hurt innovation because if a company were the 
only seller of a product, the company would not have to improve the 
product to compete.
70
  However, this is not the case in the search engine 
market, where companies like Google offer their services for free.   
Additionally, the status quo shows that despite Google’s dominance in 
 
77. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 65. KEVIN COATES, COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 10 
(2011). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911) 
(describing the “danger of deterioration in quality” of a monopolized product). 
 68. Of course, Google’s opponents are quick to assert that not all of Google’s services 
are free.  For example, Google has several “customers” who pay for advertisements on 
Google so that their websites will appear prominently in Google search engine results.  
However, these are customers not of the online search market, but of the search advertising 
market, which has failed as a “relevant market” for antitrust purposes because it is 
indistinguishable from general online advertising.  This is more thoroughly discussed a few 
paragraphs below in my discussion of KinderStart.com LLC v. Google. 
 69. See infra text accompanying notes 71–77 (discussing several Google innovations 
developed while it enjoyed a dominant market share of the search engine industry). 
 70. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 22 U.S. at 1 (evaluating the anticompetitive practices 
of a large petroleum company and concluding that they amounted to a conspiracy to 
monopolize the oil industry). 
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the search engine industry, innovation in the market has not ceased.  For 
example, on December 7, 2009, Google introduced “Google Goggles,” 
which allows Android phones to search the web by taking a picture of an 
object instead of typing in words.
71
  Less than a year later, Google 
introduced “Google Instant,” which displays search results as you type, 
even before your terms are fully entered.
72
  In 2011, Google introduced 
“Google Voice Search,” which allows users to search the web by speaking 
search terms into a microphone instead of typing in words.
73
  In early 2012, 
Google introduced personalized searches, which allow users to personalize 
their searches when signed into a Google account.
74
  Only a few months 
later, Google introduced “Handwrite,” which allows users to search on a 
tablet or smartphone by writing search terms with their fingers as opposed 
to entering them on a keyboard.
75
  Most recently, Google introduced 
“Google Now,” which collects a user’s search history and, based off of the 
user’s search habits, delivers personalized information to the user.
76
  All of 
these search engine innovations were developed in a short span of three to 
four years, and do not even begin to cover all of the innovations Google has 
brought to the search engine industry. 
The underlying purpose of federal antitrust laws—to prevent price 
hikes and to encourage innovation—simply does not map onto the complex 
search engine industry, and enforcement of these laws would not achieve 
the goal of improving consumer welfare.  In fact, some commentators have 
suggested that applying federal antitrust laws to Google may even hinder 
innovation, thereby hurting consumer welfare.  For example, less than a 
year after the FTC ended its antitrust investigation into Google, Google 
launched a new search algorithm called “Hummingbird,” which has been 
referred to as “the biggest search change in a decade.”
77
  This recent 
innovation might not have been possible had the FTC pursued an antitrust 
case against Google, as the burden of having to have its decisions approved 
 
 71. Katie Lepi, The Evolution of Google Search Over The Past 5 Years, EDUDEMIC 
(Jan. 7, 2013), http://edudemic.com/2013/01/the-evolution-of-google-search/. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  For a video introducing Google Handwrite, see Google, Handwrite, a new way 
to search on Google, YOUTUBE (July 26, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uyeJXK 
fAcpc. 
 76. For more information about “Google Now,” see Google Now. The right information 
at just the right time, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/landing/now/ (last visited Sept. 3, 
2013).  For a reporter’s commentary on “Google Now,” see Claire Cain Miller, Addicted to 
Apps, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, at SR3. 
 77. Gordon Crovitz, Google Search: Regulation Yields to Innovation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
7, 2013, at A15 (arguing that it is no coincidence that Google was able to launch one of the 
biggest innovations to its search engine in the same year that the FTC ceased investigating it 
for anticompetitive practices). 
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by regulators could have convinced Google to not pursue Hummingbird.
78
   
B. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
The main source of antitrust law cited in objections to Google’s search 
engine practices is section 2 of the Sherman Act, which makes it unlawful 
for a company to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce” in the United States.
79
  To prevail on a section 2 
monopolization claim, two elements must be established:  (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.
80
  Neither one of these elements is met in the case against 
Google search. 
1. Monopoly Power in the Relevant Market 
Although there are no strict numbers dictating what constitutes a 
monopoly in a given market, courts have estimated that a market share 
between seventy and ninety percent suggests monopoly power.
81
  Whether 
or not Google possesses monopoly power by this standard in a market is 
not in serious dispute.
82
  The critical issue lies in determining what 
 
 78.  See id. (pointing to the stifling of innovation that occurred at IBM after antitrust 
cases were brought against it). 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 80. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
 81. See United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding 
that 75% to 80% market share of a dental supply manufacturer on a revenue basis was 
“more than adequate to establish a prima facie case of [monopoly] power”); Exxon Corp. v. 
Berwick Bay Real Estate Partners, 748 F.2d 937, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) 
(finding that a 52% share of the market was “an insufficient basis as a matter of law,” to 
prove that a major oil company was guilty of antitrust violations); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that a 90% market 
share “is enough to constitute a monopoly”).  It is typically required that a monopolist 
foreclose at least 40% of the relevant market before antitrust liability can be found.  See, 
e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984) (finding that a hospital 
with 30% of the relevant market share did not possess sufficient market power for antitrust 
liability purposes). 
 82. Roughly 65% to 70% of all Internet searches on computers in the United States are 
done through Google. The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening 
Competition?: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and 
Consumer Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6-7 (2011) (statement of Sen. 
Herb Kohl).  Roughly 95% of all mobile device searches are done on Google.  Id.  In second 
place, Microsoft’s Bing accounts for around 15% of Internet searches in the U.S., with 
Yahoo in a close third, accounting for 14% of Internet searches in the United States.  
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“relevant market” is at stake.  Defining the “relevant market” is critical in 
antitrust cases because it often determines the outcome of the case.
83
  A 
“relevant market” for purposes of a section 2 claim is defined as “the field 
in which meaningful competition is said to exist.”
84
 
Citing the large number of searches conducted on Google as opposed 
to other search engines, Google opponents often breeze through the 
analysis of what the “relevant market” is. For example, FairSearch, a 
coalition of businesses and organizations devoted to fostering competition 
and fair practices in online search, published a report arguing that Google 
search violates section 2 of the Sherman Act.
85
  The report devoted most of 
its analysis to the collection of data showing how many searches are done 
on Google as opposed to other search engines, while giving little to no 
analysis on what constitutes the “relevant market.”
86
  Instead, the report 
simply asserted that Google’s monopoly exists in the “Internet search and 
search advertising” markets.
87
 
Failing to define the relevant market might cause a section 2 claim to 
fail.  New innovations in online search and search advertising have 
complicated the search engine market.
88
  Given that the allegation is that 
Google manipulates its search engine results by prioritizing its own 
products and services over those of its competitors, the “relevant market” at 
stake is the search engine market, not the search advertising market.
89
  This 
failure to pinpoint the precise “relevant market” for section 2 purposes is 
the reason KinderStart, an Internet website that served as a directory and 
search engine linking to resources on subjects relating to young children, 
failed in its section 2 claim against Google when it tried to sue in federal 
 
Streitfeld & Wyatt, supra note 6. 
 83. Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1806 (1990); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 
504 U.S. 451, 469 (1992) (“[M]arket definition generally determines the result of the 
case.”). 
 84. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip 
op. at 7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (quoting Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 85. Google’s Transformation From Gateway to Gatekeeper: How Google’s 
Exclusionary and Anticompetitive Conduct Restricts Innovation and Deceives Consumers, 
FAIRSEARCH (last visited Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/10/Googles-Transformation-from-Gateway-to-Gatekeeper.pdf. 
 86. Id. at 5-14. 
 87. Id. at 10. 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77 (discussing several of Google’s 
innovations in the search engine industry). 
 89. Of course, there are also objections that Google opponents have made to Google 
AdWords and other Google practices related to its online advertising.  See, e.g., Steve Lohr, 
Antitrust Cry From Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at B1 (discussing Microsoft 
claims against Google, including one that Google’s contracts prohibit the use of third-party 
software to move advertisers’ data from one ad platform to another). 
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court.
90
  In fact, KinderStart alleged the same two “relevant markets” that 
FairSearch did, but ultimately to no avail.
91
 
In 2003, KinderStart enrolled in Google’s AdSense program, under 
which it would pay Google for a series of sponsored links.
92
  Later that 
year, KinderStart began placing ads from Google onto its site in exchange 
for payments from Google.
93
  KinderStart alleged that two years later, its 
website suffered a seventy percent reduction in monthly page views and 
traffic.
94
 It subsequently realized that common search terms on Google’s 
search engine no longer listed KinderStart as a result as prominently as it 
had done in the past.
95
  As a result of this drop in search engine referrals 
and prominence, KinderStart alleged that its monthly AdSense revenue 
dropped by over eighty percent.  KinderStart’s PageRank dropped to a 
zero, the lowest ranking a website could receive.
96
  Having not received any 
advance notice of this significant change and believing it had not violated 
any of Google’s website guidelines, KinderStart filed a section 2 claim 
against Google in the Northern District of California.
97
 
Like FairSearch, KinderStart alleged that Google was guilty of 
attempted monopolization in two relevant markets.
98
  First, it alleged that 
Google owned and operated its engine in the “Search Market,” which it 
claimed to be “the market of search engine design, implementation and 
usage in the United States.”
99
  Second, KinderStart alleged that Google 
dominated the “Search Ad Market,” which consisted of a “universe of 
advertisers who seek and pay for online advertising” and who “target and 
reach Internet browsers and users of search engines.”
100
 
The Northern District of California rejected both theories.  The 
“Search Market” theory failed as a “relevant market” because Google, like 
most other search engines, provides its search services free of cost, and 
antitrust law does not concern itself with “competition in the provision of 
free services.”
101
  Thus, the court held that “the Search Market [was] not a 
 
 90. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip 
op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
 91. Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 34, 38, KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 
C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) [hereinafter KinderStart SAC]. 
 92. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 4. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 5. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 3. 
 99. KinderStart SAC, supra note 91, ¶ 34. 
 100. Id. ¶ 38. 
 101. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip 
op. at 8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
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‘[relevant] market’ for purposes of antitrust law.”
102
  The court also rejected 
the “Search Ad Market” theory because the court was not persuaded by 
KinderStart’s distinction of the Search Ad Market from other forms of 
online advertising.
103
  Because a website can choose to engage in search-
based advertising or advertising through postings independent of any 
search, the court found that search-based advertising was “reasonably 
interchangeable with other forms of Internet advertising.”
104
 It therefore 
found the Search Ad Market “too narrow” to constitute a relevant market 
for antitrust purposes.
105
 
As explained by the Northern District of California, there is no 
“relevant market” that Google monopolizes or attempts to monopolize, 
since the actual market at stake—the search engine market—is one where 
services are provided free of cost, and antitrust law is not concerned with 
competition in the provision of free services.  The “search ad market” 
would also fail as a relevant market because it is “too narrow” to constitute 
a relevant market for antitrust purposes and is indistinguishable from other 
forms of online advertising.  Therefore, the first element of a Sherman Act 
section 2 claim cannot be established against Google. 
2. Willful Acquisition or Maintenance of Power 
The second element of a section 2 claim is the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of monopoly power, which is to be distinguished from growth 
or development as a consequence of a superior product.
106
  This generally 
requires showing that the monopoly was achieved through anticompetitive 
conduct.
107
  This ensures that competitors who achieve monopoly power 
through honest competition and a superior product will not be punished for 
their success, which would have the counterproductive effect of 
discouraging innovation.
108
 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  Although not argued by KinderStart, the court also noted that the Search Market 
and Search Ad Market combined together would still fail to constitute a “relevant market” 
for antitrust purposes, since such a combination would “suffer from the same lack of 
breadth” that renders the Search Ad Market inadequate to suffice as a “relevant market.”  Id. 
at 8-9. 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 107. See United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (finding a monopoly 
where a security company achieved its hold on the market through exclusionary practices). 
 108. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004) (discussing that in order to “safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession 
of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct.” (emphasis in original)). 
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Google opponents argue that if Google demotes the ranking of its 
competitors’ websites and prioritizes its own websites in its display of 
search results, it willfully denies competitors of the opportunity to compete 
in the market by denying them traffic they would have gotten had Google 
not demoted their ranking, thereby engaging in anticompetitive conduct.
109
  
There are two fundamental flaws with this assumption.  First, Google has 
no duty to its competitors.
110
  There is a distinction between (1) Google 
taking action to promote its own product, such as returning its own vertical 
search engine results at the top of a SERP (such as Google Maps), which 
necessarily involves a lowering of the ranking of other non-Google 
websites (such as MapQuest); and (2) Google buying out its competitors 
(such as MapQuest) so that Google Maps becomes the only online map 
service in the market.  The first action is a legitimate, business action and 
the second is an unlawful practice in violation of federal antitrust laws.
111
 
Of course, all companies have the right to create a website for Internet 
users to view.  However, there is no right to have one’s website 
prominently listed in the first page of a SERP on Google’s platform.
112
  To 
argue otherwise would be as absurd as arguing that CVS would be 
violating the Sherman Act if it placed its own CVS-branded over-the-
counter medication prominently at the very front of the store, while burying 
in the back of the store non-CVS-branded over-the-counter medication, 
such as Tylenol and Excedrin.  Just as CVS has the right to promote its 
own products, such as by placing CVS-branded medication at the front of 
its store, Google has the right to promote its own product, such as by 
displaying Google Maps at the top of its search platform.  The mere fact 
that promoting one’s own product may have a negative business effect on 
one’s competitors does not itself make the practice anticompetitive.
113
  
 
 109. See, e.g., TradeComet Complaint, supra note 46, at 3-4 (alleging that Google drove 
the plaintiff out of business by decreasing its prominence on Google’s platform because 
Google viewed the plaintiff as a dangerous competitor). 
 110. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 12 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (“[T]here is 
no duty to aid competitors.”) (quoting MetroNet Servs., Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 
1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 111.  “The law is violated only if the company tries to maintain or acquire a monopoly 
through unreasonable methods.” Single Firm Conduct, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,  
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-
conduct (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).  
 112.  However, one may pay for the privilege of appearing at the top of all search results 
in a “paid results” section. GOOGLE ADWORDS, http://www.google.com/adwords (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 113.  For an action to be an impermissible anticompetitive behavior under the Sherman 
Act, it must be “unreasonable.”  For example, aggressive exclusionary or predatory actions 
would be considered violations.  AN FTC GUIDE TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 111, 
at 24. 
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Companies are not required to promote the products of their competitors.
114
 
To be sure, Google theoretically could become the only search engine 
in common use and Google could lower the ranking of certain websites.  In 
that case, the lowest rank websites could become the “unknown 
unknown,”
115
 meaning users would never know about these websites 
because they would not come up within the first few pages of search 
results.  Such an argument assumes that Google is the only way users can 
find a website.  However, websites have other advertising options.  For 
example, Angie’s List, a website that compiles reviews of local service 
companies, advertises through TV commercials, as opposed to relying on 
Google to advertise its website.
116
  As a result, Angie’s List has achieved 
nationwide recognition, in part by relying upon sources other than Google 
for advertising.  The fact that some companies are unwilling to advertise 
their own product, and instead choose to rely upon Google to “advertise” 
their product for them, does not transform Google’s refusal to “advertise” 
for them into an anticompetitive act. 
This is where I diverge from other scholars that have written on the 
subject, for I believe not only that Google has no obligation to list its 
competitors at the top of a SERP, but I also argue that Google has no 
obligation to list its competitors on a SERP at all.
117
  By listing a 
competitor’s website as a search result, the competitor essentially is 
receiving advertisement space on Google’s platform.
118
  Google is under no 
 
 114. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 
1986) (“[I]t is clear that a firm with lawful monopoly power has no general duty to help its 
competitors . . . .”). 
 115. Raff, supra note 8; see also Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1178 (“Missing 
results are an ‘unknown unknown[:]’ users for whom certain information is suppressed do 
not even know that they do not know the information.”). 
 116. To view one of Angie’s List commercials, see Angie’s List TV Spot, ‘Saving Time 
For Members,’ ISPOT.TV, http://www.ispot.tv/ad/7oc2/angies-list-saving-time-for-members 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2013).  The website for Angie’s List also lists other non-Google 
companies that have assisted in its advertisement, including MSNBC, the New York Times, 
Fox & Friends, and the Today Show.  ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/quick-
tour.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). 
 117. While there is great disagreement over whether Google must refrain from removing 
its competitors from appearing at the top of a SERP, even scholars who believe Google need 
not refrain from such an act believe that Google must refrain from removing its competitors 
from a SERP altogether.  See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (proposing that many of Google’s seemingly biased search practices are 
defensible but advocating close monitoring by the Federal Trade Commission of these 
practices in the future). 
 118. Appearing as a search result in a Google search is so powerful that companies 
frequently pay Google to display their website in response to search queries, though the 
websites appear in a paid advertisements section on the right-hand side of the page labeled 
“Ads.”  GOOGLE ADWORDS, supra note 112.  For example, a search for “sweaters” will 
return standard search results on the left-hand side and paid search results on the right-hand 
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obligation to advertise for its competitors and therefore is free to remove a 
competitor entirely from appearing in particular searches on its platform, so 
long as Google makes no misrepresentation claiming that it does not do so.  
To return to the CVS example, not only does CVS have the right to bury 
Tylenol and Excedrin medication at the back of the store while prominently 
displaying CVS-branded medication at the front, CVS also has the right not 
to carry Tylenol and Excedrin at all.  It would be nonsensical to accuse 
CVS of violating the Sherman Act simply because it refused to carry 
medication sold by its competitors. 
Additionally, this second element of willful acquisition or 
maintenance cannot be satisfied because a company will not be penalized 
under the Sherman Act for achieving monopoly power if it did so as a 
result of a “superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
119
  
Anticompetitive conduct must be shown.
120
  Attempts to establish this 
element against Google would fail because Google can easily claim its 
success results from its superior product.  Google was the first search 
engine to depart from the traditional template initial search engines 
followed.
121
  Rather than exclusively relying on algorithms to sort data and 
calculate relevance, Google developed PageRank, a new formula that 
accounted for the number of times other websites linked to a given page in 
its determination of relevance.
122
  PageRank was radically different from 
the formulas used by other search engines and immediately proved quite 
successful, allowing Google to produce more relevant results than the 
results of its competitors.
123
 
As mentioned earlier, critics also object to Google OneBox as an 
anticompetitive practice.  They argue that it gives priority to Google’s own 
vertical search engines over its competitors, thereby directing traffic away 
from Google’s competitors and directly hurting competition.
124
  However, 
as the FTC investigation concluded, Google OneBox is not anticompetitive 
conduct; it is legitimate business conduct aimed at improving Google’s 
products and services to its users.
125
  According to the New York Times, 
Google had presented the FTC with test results from outside focus groups 
hired to review different versions of Google SERPs, and the results showed 
 
side, with “Sweaters at JCPenney” appearing as the first paid advertisement. 
 119. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1335-36 (2008) 
(outlining Google’s rise to prominence and the ways in which its methods diverged from 
those of its competitors). 
 122. Id. at 1337. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Raff, supra note 8 (arguing that Google’s preferential placement of its 
own websites over its competitors’ websites hurts competition). 
 125. FTC Press Release, supra note 3. 
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that more users preferred SERPs that displayed a Google OneBox result at 
the top, as opposed to SERPs that did not.
126
  When subjects were asked to 
compare side-by-side examples of a SERP with the traditional blue 
hyperlinks to specialty travel sites with a SERP displaying a Google 
OneBox result containing links to airlines and fares through GoogleFlights, 
“fewer than one in five users preferred the page with links only.”
127
  Thus, 
the FTC concluded that Google engaged in legitimate, business activity to 
improve its product design when it determined the change to using Google 
OneBox results would be better for the consumer.
128
  While acknowledging 
that Google OneBox would have had a negative business impact on many 
of Google’s competitors, the FTC found that the “totality of the evidence” 
showed that “any negative impact on actual or potential competitors was 
incidental . . . .”
129
  Google did not engage in anticompetitive conduct and 
therefore did not violate the Sherman Act. 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In addition to raising antitrust issues, Google search engine 
manipulation also raises First Amendment issues.  In this section, I first 
analyze cases where plaintiffs sued Google alleging search engine 
manipulation. In these cases, Google was able to escape liability on First 
Amendment grounds for a wide variety of claims, including tortious 
interference with contractual relationships, fraud, deceptive business 
practices, and defamation.  Second, I outline the “transmission theory” 
response to First Amendment defenses of Google search engine practices, 
and argue that this theory ultimately fails to deny Google of its First 
Amendment rights. 
A. How Courts Have Treated the First Amendment Issue 
There are three major cases in which courts have adjudicated claims 
alleging search engine manipulation by Google and Google has raised a 
First Amendment defense.  In all three cases, the court dismissed the 
complaint.
130
  This section will discuss each one in turn. 
 
 126. Edward Wyatt, Critics of Google Antitrust Ruling Fault the Focus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
7, 2013, at B1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. FTC Statement, supra note 57, at 2. 
 130. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip 
op. at 36-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 634–
35 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, slip op. at 
8 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
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1. Search King, Inc. v. Google, Tech, Inc. 
In Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech, Inc., the Western District of 
Oklahoma was presented with two questions:  (1) whether a representation 
of the relative significance of a website is a form of protected speech, and 
(2) if so, whether the search engine responsible for making these 
representations is insulated from tort liability arising out of the intentional 
manipulation of such a representation.
131
 
Search King was a private company specializing in search engine 
optimization.  Website operators pay search engine optimizers (SEOs) such 
as Search King to increase the “ranking” of their website so that their 
website appears as one of the first few search results in certain search 
queries.  This allows websites to “game the system” by manipulating 
PageRank into believing that their website is more relevant than Google’s 
algorithms ordinarily would find.  Search King does this by seeking out and 
paying highly-ranked websites to sell advertisement placements on their 
website to Search King’s clients.  By increasing the number of websites 
that link to one page, Search King is able to increase the ranking of their 
client’s website.  Therefore, by selling enough advertisement placements, 
websites can pay Search King to essentially “increase” their PageRank so 
that they appear higher in a SERP than they ordinarily would, thereby 
bringing more traffic to their website and ultimately bringing them more 
revenue. 
From February 2001 until July 2002, Search King was assigned a 
PageRank of seven.
132
  By September 2002, Search King’s PageRank had 
dropped to a four.
133
  Search King alleged that this decrease in rank 
adversely impacted its business and filed a tortious interference with 
contract
134
 claim against Google, seeking injunctive relief.
135
  Search King 
argued that PageRanks are objectively verifiable, noting that the PageRank 
system is patented and that since ideas cannot be patented, PageRank must 
be “objective in nature, and therefore capable of being proven true or 
 
 131. Search King, Inc., slip op. at 1. 
 132. Id. at 2. 
 133. Id. at 2–3. 
 134. To prevail on a tortious interference with contract claim under Oklahoma state law, 
the plaintiff must prove three elements:  (1) the defendant interfered with one of the 
plaintiff’s a business or contractual relationships, (2) the interference was malicious and 
wrongful, without excuse or justification, and (3) the interference was a proximate cause for 
an injury suffered by the plaintiff.  Id. at 4; see also Daniels v. Union Baptist Ass’n, 2001 
OK 63, 55 P.3d 1012, 1015 (Okla. 2001) (listing the elements necessary to establish a cause 
of action for malicious interference with contract or business relations under Oklahoma state 
law). 
 135. Search King, Inc., slip op. at 3. 
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false.”
136
  Search King argued that its lowered PageRank score was 
therefore a provably false statement made by Google. Google responded 
that PageRank consists of opinions entitled to First Amendment protection 
and that Google was therefore shielded from tort liability.
137
 
The court ultimately agreed with Google, finding that PageRank 
consisted of “constitutionally protected opinions.”
138
  The court explained 
that although the PageRank algorithm certainly has an objective nature, the 
algorithm was not at issue; rather, it was the subjective result produced by 
the algorithm that Search King was contesting.
139
  The court distinguished 
between process and result.
140
  The process by which Google arranges its 
search results is through the PageRank algorithm, which is objective.
141
  
However, the result is the actual PageRank, or the numerical representation 
of the significance of a website, which the court found to be 
“fundamentally subjective in nature.”
142
  Since PageRank consists merely 
of opinions on the relevance of certain websites, there is no way to prove 
that the PageRank of a given website is false, and the court thus concluded 
that PageRank was entitled to “full constitutional protection.”
143
 
2. Langdon v. Google, Inc. 
The second case accusing Google of search engine manipulation was 
Langdon v. Google, Inc., a case decided by the District of Delaware in 
2007.
 144
  The plaintiff argued that Google had a duty to carry his 
advertisements, which charged North Carolina government officials with 
fraud and the Chinese government with committing various atrocities.
145
  
The plaintiff argued that Google’s refusal to run his advertisements and 
Google’s alleged removal of his websites from certain search queries 
(which allegedly hurt his ranking on other search engines) violated his First 
Amendment rights.
146
  He further alleged violations of Delaware law 
through fraud, breach of contract, and deceptive business practices.
147
 
In response, Google argued that the injunctive relief sought by the 
 
 136. Id. at 5. 
 137. Id. at 4. 
 138. Id. at 7. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 6. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 7 (quoting Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s 
Services, Inc., 175 F. 3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 144. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 (D. Del. 2007). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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plaintiff would compel Google to speak in a manner that would violate 
Google’s own First Amendment rights.
148
  The court agreed, explaining that 
the First Amendment guarantees not only the right to speak, but also the 
right not to speak.
149
  On this ground, the court granted Google’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint.
150
  The court also held that Google was immunized 
from the plaintiff’s claims under section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, which reads in relevant part: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good 
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.
151
 
Analogizing Google to a publisher, entitled to editorial discretion in 
“deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content” as it 
sees fit, the court ruled in favor of Google.
 152
  In rejecting the plaintiff’s 
argument that section 230 was inapplicable because his ads were not 
obscene or harassing, the court held that Google’s refusal to run the 
plaintiff’s ads fell under the “otherwise objectionable” prong of section 230 
and was therefore protected against suit.
153
 
The court further held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim that 
Google had violated his First Amendment right to free speech because 
Google is a “private, for profit” company, “not subject to constitutional free 
speech guarantees.”
154
  Rather, Google is a search engine that “uses the 
internet as a medium to conduct business.”
155
  The plaintiff’s argument that 
Google was a state actor because it worked with state universities was 
found “specious.”
156
  The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
there was a sufficient nexus between Google and the State that Google’s 
actions could fairly be treated as those of the State itself.
157
  Because 
Google was not a state actor, it could not be found to have violated the 
 
 148. Id. at 629-30. 
 149. Id.  The first Amendment protects not only the right to speak, but also the right not 
to speak.  See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that 
compelling schoolchildren to salute the flag violated their First Amendment right not to 
speak). 
 150. Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 629-30. 
 151. Id. at 630 (quoting the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) 
(2006)) (emphasis added). 
 152. Id. (quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
 153. Id. at 630-31. 
 154. Id. at 631. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  The state action doctrine will be discussed more thoroughly in Part IV.A.3. 
 157. Id. at 631-32. 
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plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.
158
 
The plaintiff’s claim that Google engaged in deceptive business 
practice was also dismissed.  The dismissal, however, was due to a failure 
to allege that the acts at issue took place in Delaware, an essential element 
of the Delaware state law claim for deceptive trade practices.
159
  The court 
did not substantively conclude that Google had not engaged in deceptive 
business practices.  This leaves open the possibility for a future deceptive 
business practices claim against Google, as long as the jurisdictional 
requirements of the claim are met. 
3. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. 
The third case alleging Google search engine manipulation was 
KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc.,
160
 discussed earlier in Part III.B.1 of 
this Comment.  To briefly summarize, KinderStart was an Internet website 
that enrolled in Google’s AdSense program, under which it would pay 
Google for a series of sponsored links.
161
  Two years later, KinderStart 
suffered a significant reduction in monthly page views and traffic and 
subsequently realized that common search terms on Google’s search engine 
no longer listed KinderStart as a result as prominently as it had done in the 
past.
162
  KinderStart’s PageRank dropped to a zero, the lowest PageRank a 
website can receive.
163
  In 2006, KinderStart filed suit against Google, 
alleging, inter alia, freedom of speech violations under the United States 
and California Constitutions, deceptive business practices under California 
state law, and defamation.
164
 
 
 158. Id. at 632. 
 159. Id. at 633-34 (referring to Delaware’s Consumer Protection Act, 6 DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 6  §§ 2501-2598 (1953)).  Although Google was successful in having most of Plaintiff’s 
claims dismissed, the court denied Google’s motion to dismiss on Plaintiff’s breach of 
contract claim, finding that Plaintiff adequately alleged such a claim, which requires 
establishing: (1) that a contract existed, (2) that Google breached an obligation imposed by 
the contract, and (3) that the breach resulted in damage to Plaintiff.  Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 
2d at 632 (citing VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 
2003)). 
 160. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
 161. Id. at 4. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. Id. at 2.  In the first amended complaint, KinderStart alleged nine claims for relief:  
(1) freedom of speech violations under the United States and California Constitutions, (2) 
attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act, (3) monopolization under the Sherman 
Act, (4) violations of the Communications Act, (5) unfair competition under California state 
law, (6) prior discrimination under California state law, (7) breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, (8) defamation and libel, and (9) negligent interference with 
prospective economic advantage.  First Amended Complaint, KinderStart.com LLC v. 
Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82481 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 
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First, KinderStart argued that Google violated the California Business 
and Professions Code by engaging in unlawful business practices, 
including PageRank deflation and blockage of competitors’ websites.
165
  
The court rejected this claim, explaining that KinderStart failed to identify 
“specific terms of the AdSense agreement that are deceptive” and also 
failed to indicate how the agreement was deceptive.
166
  However, this ruling 
was specific to the AdSense agreement between KinderStart and Google 
and was grounded in the technical issue of pleading requirements, as 
opposed to a substantive conclusion that Google does not engage in 
deceptive business practices.
167
  Thus, the court left open the possibility for 
a deceptive business practices claim by consumers alleging manipulative 
practices in the search process, rather than by website operators suing on 
their unhappy with their AdSense agreements. 
Second, KinderStart alleged defamation against Google based on 
Google’s public presentation of KinderStart.com as having a PageRank of 
zero.
168
  Under California state law, defamation exists “whenever a false 
and unprivileged statement which has a natural tendency to injure or which 
causes special damage is communicated to one or more persons who 
understand its defamatory meaning and its application to the injured 
party.”
169
  To prevail on its defamation claim, KinderStart had to allege a 
provably false statement.
170
  KinderStart argued that the PageRank assigned 
to its website was a false statement because its website retained relevance, 
and a PageRank assignment of zero was “mathematically impossible within 
the normal operation”
171
 of PageRank.  In sum, KinderStart argued that 
KinderStart was harmed by Google’s false statement “that Google had 
determined objectively that the KinderStart website was not worth 
visiting.”
172
 
However, the court found that KinderStart failed to adequately allege 
that Google actually represented its PageRank algorithm as “objective” and 
therefore dismissed the claim, since if Google represented PageRank as a 
 
2006) [hereinafter KinderStart FAC].  The Northern District of California delivered an order 
ruling on these claims on July 13, 2006.  KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS) (N.D. Cal. 
July 13, 2006).  Most claims were dismissed with leave to amend.  Because the KinderStart 
II opinion frequently references analysis in KinderStart I to support its decision to dismiss 
KinderStart’s claims, usually without leave to amend, both opinions will be referenced. 
 165. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip op. at 26. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 27. 
 169. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 9 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 28. 
 172. Id. 
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subjective opinion, there could be no defamation claim.
173
  This leaves open 
the possibility that, with sufficient evidence showing that Google 
represents PageRank as a purely objective algorithm, a plaintiff could 
plausibly allege a defamation claim based on an assignment of a zero 
PageRank to its website. 
KinderStart also alleged that Google violated its First Amendment
174
 
rights by blocking search engine results from showing KinderStart’s 
website content, and further alleging that its website consequently suffered 
“irreparable harm in the suppression of [its] thoughts, facts, opinions, 
information, and communications that should have otherwise been accessed 
and received . . . .”
175
  However, a demonstration of state action is a 
necessary prerequisite to any First Amendment claim.
176
  In the case of 
private-party defendants, plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s 
infringement constituted state action.
177
  In its case against Google, 
KinderStart alleged three theories of state action:  (1) entwinement, (2) a 
symbiotic relationship with the government, and (3) public forum.
178
 
The test for whether there is state action under the entwinement theory 
is whether there is a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the 
challenged action . . . that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as 
that of the State itself.”
179
  KinderStart argued that Google was sufficiently 
entwined with the government because of its digital library projects,
180
 
which digitally archived at least one state-owned university library and 
which also supported a project by the Library of Congress.
181
  In evaluating 
this claim, the court compared the case to Brentwood Academy v. 
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,
182
 where entwinement 
was found.  In Brentwood, eighty-four percent of a private association’s 
members were public schools, which provided significant financial support 
for the association.
183
  Additionally, the state appointed members to the 
governing body of the private association, and association employees 
 
 173. Id. at 28-30. 
 174. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”).  KinderStart also alleged violations of its freedom of speech rights under the 
California Constitution, which is more protective and inclusive than the United States 
Constitution. 
 175. KinderStart FAC, supra note 164, ¶¶ 107, 108. 
 176. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip op. at 20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
 177. Id. (citing George v. Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 178. Id. at 20-21. 
 179. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
 180. For an explanation of Google’s digital library project, see Google Books Library 
Project—An Enhanced Card Catalog of the World’s Books, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). 
 181. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 8 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006). 
 182. 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 183. KinderStart I, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), at 8. 
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participated in the state retirement system.
184
  In comparing KinderStart’s 
case to Brentwood, the court found that KinderStart fell far short of 
establishing a “sufficiently close nexus” between Google and the state, and 
therefore found no state action under the entwinement theory.
185
 
KinderStart also alleged that there was a symbiotic relationship 
between Google and the government.
186
  If a private entity confers 
significant financial benefits to the government that are indispensable to the 
government’s financial success, then a symbiotic relationship may be 
established.
187
  The court rejected this theory with little to no analysis, 
however, because KinderStart failed to allege a symbiotic relationship 
between Google and the State “with respect to the activities that form[ed] 
the basis of the [Second Amended Complaint].”
188
  The facts that 
KinderStart alleged to support its symbiotic relationship theory were 
Google’s digital library projects, which were not of concern in the 
complaint.
189
  The complaint only concerned PageRank and the listing of 
Google’s search engine results. 
The third theory KinderStart pursued was the public forum theory.  
KinderStart argued that the Google search engine is a public forum because 
“[a]nyone with Internet access [could] go to [Google’s] own website or any 
number of thousands of other Websites having a ‘Google Search Box’ as 
provided by Google to use the Engine without payment or charge . . . 
Google has willfully dedicated the Engine for public use.”
190
  KinderStart 
further alleged: 
Defendant Google created and now manages, with the largest 
search engine in history, a freely accessible, nationwide public 
forum for the exchange and flow of Speech Content by virtue of 
the Engine.  Defendant Google has intentionally, willfully and 
openly dedicated the Engine for public use and public benefit.  
Defendant Google, by and through the Engine, is a speech 
intermediary.
191
 
The court began its analysis by noting there was no precedent to 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id.; see also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) 
(holding that actions by a private lessee who leased space for a restaurant from a state 
parking authority in a publicly owned building constituted state action). 
 187. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip op. at 22 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“In 
a symbiotic relationship the government has ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence (with a private entity) that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the 
challenged activity.’” (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 725). 
 188. Id. (emphasis added). 
 189. Id. at 22-23. 
 190. KinderStart SAC, supra note 91, ¶ 91. 
 191. Id. ¶ 251. 
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support KinderStart’s claim that “a search engine was a public forum for 
speech merely because it gives consumers the ability to find speech on the 
Internet.”
192
  The court explained that a private space does not become a 
public forum simply because it is used for speech.
193
  Rather, the point of 
inquiry must focus on the manner in which a forum is used.
194
  Other 
considerations in the analysis include the nature of the “property” at issue 
(in this case, the Internet) and the disruption that might be caused by the 
speaker’s activities.
195
  However, the court did not provide much 
clarification on this analysis, perhaps because there exists little to no 
authority for the court to cite on how to determine whether “property” on 
the web constitutes a public forum or not. 
B. The “Transmission of Speech” Theory 
An interesting part of KinderStart’s public forum argument can be 
found in its characterization of Google as a “speech intermediary.”
196
  
KinderStart argued that access to Internet speech through Google’s search 
engine warrants treating it as a public forum.
197
  As indicated above, the 
court dismissed this argument as lacking any merit since there was no 
precedential authority to support it.
198
 
KinderStart’s characterization of Google does not do much to support 
its public forum analysis.  However, such a characterization could gain 
traction in arguing that Google search engine results really are not speech 
at all.  While it is widely recognized that speech is generally entitled to 
government protection under the First Amendment, it is less clear whether 
the mere transmission of speech, an action done by “speech 
intermediaries,” would be entitled to those same First Amendment 
protections.
199
  This raises the following question:  Under what 
circumstances is the mere transmission of speech encompassed by the 
“freedom of speech” protected under the First Amendment? 
Professor Stuart Benjamin, professor of law at Duke University 
School of Law, argues that if search engines merely transmit speech, then 
they are not protected under the First Amendment and thus the government 
 
 192. KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. (KinderStart II), No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip 
op. at 23 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)). 
 193. Id. at 23. 
 194. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)). 
 195. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800. 
 196. KinderStart FAC, supra note 164, ¶ 104. 
 197. KinderStart II, No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), slip op. at 22-23. 
 198. Id. at 23. 
 199.  Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining 
What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1682-95 (2011). 
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is free to regulate these search engines however they see fit.
200
  Thus, 
KinderStart could have used its characterization of Google as a “speech 
intermediary” not to argue that Google engages in state action, but rather, 
that Google does not engage in “speech” at all, and thus is not entitled to 
any First Amendment protections.  KinderStart alleged that Google 
represents its search engine as nothing more than an objective algorithm.
201
  
If this is the case, then KinderStart should have argued that Google does 
not actually “speak” when it returns search results in response to search 
queries, and that it does not actually “speak” when it assigns a numerical 
PageRank score representing the relevance of a given website.  Rather, 
Google merely “transmits” speech by entering input it is given from users 
into a computer algorithm, which then automatically returns results that 
represent an objective product of an objective formula.
202
  If this were the 
case, Google would not be expressing itself in any way that can be 
analogized to speech; it would be merely acting as a short-cut for searchers 
to obtain access more easily to speech.  To illustrate this theory, Professor 
Benjamin offers the following analogy: 
Imagine that FedEx decided to speed up the delivery of 
documents addressed to companies with which it had a financial 
relationship; that is, FedEx would give preferential treatment in 
its delivery schedule to documents sent to companies that paid it 
for the privilege.  A congressional decision to ban such a practice 
may or may not be good policy, but it would not seem to raise 
First Amendment issues.  Yes, FedEx would be moving First 
 
 200. See generally id. (arguing that bare transmission of speech, while doing nothing 
more, does not constitute speech entitled to First Amendment protections); see also id. at 
1695–96 (“[A] company’s nondiscriminatory transportation (of bits or anything else) 
enables communication, but it has no content, and thus expresses no ideas . . . so regulations 
prohibiting discrimination in transmission do not, without more, trigger application of the 
Free Speech Clause.”).  This Comment refers to this theory as the “transmission of speech” 
theory.  However, this theory has also been referred to as the “conduit theory,” suggesting 
that search engines are to be regarded as conduits that simply exist to carry the speech of 
others.  See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 117.  Proponents of this theory argue that 
search engines are not “means of speech” like printing presses or cable networks, but rather, 
are “selection intermediaries” that direct users to third party speech.  See, e.g., Jennifer A. 
Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2007) (discussingProfessor Jerome Barron’s argument that 
the freedom of speech “should encompass a right of access to the media”); see also Bracha 
& Pasquale, supra note 25, at 1199 (“[S]earch engine rankings play a central instrumental 
role in facilitating effective speech by others.”). 
 201. See, e.g., KinderStart SAC, supra note 91, ¶ 2 (“Defendant Google . . . promotes 
itself as delivering . . . unblocked objective results emerging out of millions of websites in 
the United States and worldwide . . . .”). 
 202. Benjamin, supra note 199, at 1685 (“[A]nalogical reasoning highlights the 
implausibility of an interpretation of the Free Speech Clause that bare transmission is 
speech.”). 
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Amendment-protected materials—documents—from one user to 
another, but it is hard to see how transporting documents turns a 
company into a speaker for First Amendment purposes.
203
 
In the same way, Google could be seen not as actually speaking, but as 
“transporting” speech from the web to the user.   
 However persuasive one may find this analogy, Professor Benjamin’s 
transmission of speech theory is ultimately inapplicable to Google search 
for two reasons.  First, Google does far more than merely “transmit” 
speech.  For example, Google innovations such as the OneBox and Google 
Now do not merely “transmit” speech; they provide direct responses to a 
search query.
204
  These results are Google’s actual “speech.”  They consist 
of content that Google creates to respond to specific search terms (or in 
Google Now’s case, on Google’s own accord); they do not merely 
“transmit” speech from other websites through a display of hyperlinks. 
Even assuming that Google returned to the “ordinary search” world 
where it only listed hyperlinks in response to search queries, there is a 
second reason the transmission theory fails—it ignores the Search King 
distinction between process and result.
205
  In a way, it is true that Google 
simply transmits speech when it displays hyperlinks of other websites in 
response to a search query.  However, Google employees choose what 
factors their objective algorithms, like PageRank, should consider—such as 
title tags, keywords, the importance of websites containing links pointing to 
the destination website, the frequency of the search terms’ occurrence on 
the website, whether synonyms of the search terms appear on the page, and 
many others.
206
  Google employees also decide how much weight the 
algorithms should give each factor in determining what websites to display.  
Thus, while Google may appear to merely transmit speech when it displays 
websites in response to a search query, this looks only to the process by 
which Google speaks, and ignores the subjective result of the algorithm, 
which is Google’s opinion on the significance of each website.  Google’s 
opinions on what factors should be considered determine the ultimate 
result.  In this way, we are brought back full circle to the Search King 
opinion and find that Google search results are not merely instances of 
transmitted speech; they are speech themselves in the form of opinions by 
Google, opinions entitled to constitutional protection.
207
 
To be sure, Search King is not the only case that has held opinions to 
be constitutionally protected speech.  For example, in Castle Rock 
 
 203. Id. at 1685. 
 204. See supra Part I.B (discussing Google OneBox). 
 205. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, slip op. at 6 (W.D. 
Okla. May 27, 2003). 
 206. See supra Part I.A (explaining PageRank). 
 207. Search King, Inc., slip op. at 7. 
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Remodeling, LLC v. Better Business Bureau of Greater St. Louis, Inc., the 
Eastern District of Missouri dismissed a retailer’s defamation claim against 
the Better Business Bureau for statements in one of its reports on the basis 
that those statements were constitutionally protected opinions.
208
  Similarly, 
the Western District of Washington dismissed a claim that a website which 
ranked attorneys violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act 
because the court held that those rankings were constitutionally protected 
opinions.
209
  Thus, the “transmission of speech” theory is ultimately an 
insufficient tool for plaintiffs challenging Google search engine 
manipulation and, more importantly, PageRanks are constitutionally 
protected opinions that do not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of 
other websites. 
C. Fact-Based Opinions 
Even accepting the premise that Google PageRanks are opinions and 
not statements of fact, some scholars maintain that Google can still be held 
liable for assigning a low PageRank to a particular website.
210
  For 
example, Google represents its algorithms as ranking results based only on 
what is most relevant to users.
211
  Some scholars argue that Google is free 
to establish its own criteria to enter into its algorithms for determining what 
is relevant to users, but once the criteria is established, Google is not free to 
disregard the results of the algorithm.  Professor James Grimmelmann 
notes that if Google were to lower the original PageRank its algorithm 
assigned to a website, the new, altered PageRank would be a “false 
statement of fact” and such false statements of fact could subject Google to 
liability.
212
  Professor Grimmelmann cites the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. to point out that the mere fact that a 
statement is held out as an “opinion” does not shield the speaker from 
liability.
213
  As the Court in Milkovich explained: 
For instance, the statement, “I think Jones lied,” may be provable 
as false on two levels.  First, that the speaker really did not think 
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Jones had lied but said it anyway, and second that Jones really 
had not lied.  It is, of course, the second level of falsity which 
would ordinarily serve as the basis for a defamation action, 
though falsity at the first level may serve to establish malice 
where that is required for recovery.
214
 
Professor Grimmelmann analogizes this passage to search rankings.  He 
explains that if a Google algorithm assigned a low PageRank to a website 
because the criteria used in the algorithm suggested the website to be less 
relevant than other websites, then such a PageRank would be a non-
falsifiable statement that Google could not be held liable for.
215
  However, 
Google could be held liable for a first-level statement, which would exist 
where Google’s algorithm assigns a high PageRank to a website and a 
Google engineer then manually lowers the PageRank, even if the engineer 
believed the website relevant (for example, if Google lowered the 
PageRank of a website simply because the website was operated by one of 
its direct competitors).
216
  Therefore, although the PageRank of a website 
can be categorized as Google’s “opinion” of a website, it is a “fact-based 
opinion” that, notwithstanding its status as an opinion, would subject 
Google to liability if it did not actually represent how “relevant” Google’s 
algorithm found the website to be.
217
 
V. A NEW THEORY OF GOOGLE “SPEECH” 
In reviewing the cases and theories detailed above, the state of the law 
surrounding search engine manipulation appears to be as follows:  (1) 
Google rankings of how websites appear in search results are 
constitutionally protected opinions,
218
 though some suggest these opinions 
are protected only if they are not further manipulated by Google engineers 
after the algorithm has produced a ranking,
219
 (2) Google is a private entity, 
not a state actor, and therefore cannot be guilty of violating First 
Amendment protections of other parties,
220
 and (3) Google cannot be found 
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guilty of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act because there 
is no “relevant market” for antitrust purposes that Google can be found to 
be monopolizing, and further, Google does not engage in anticompetitive 
conduct by lowering the PageRank of websites.
221
 
Does this mean that Google is entirely shielded from suits alleging 
search engine manipulation?  Not exactly.  A review of the cases above 
will show that there are two claims that can still be plausibly alleged 
against Google, if more adequately pleaded:  (1) deceptive business 
practices under relevant state law and (2) defamation under relevant state 
law.  Based on the courts’ analyses above, a plaintiff could allege that 
Google engages in deceptive business practices under relevant state law 
(the California Business and Professions Code, for example) by 
representing its search results as objective representations of the most 
relevant websites for the search terms entered, when in fact, Google 
manipulates them by inputting its subjective opinions.  For example, 
Google could prioritize its own products and services by representing its 
own websites as the most relevant and competitors’ websites as less 
relevant.  Second, a plaintiff could allege a defamation claim against 
Google if Google unjustifiably lowered its PageRank and if, as explained 
above, Google made representations to the public that its PageRank 
assignment to websites was an objective determination of the relevance of a 
website, free of human manipulation and subjective influence. 
If a plaintiff were to make these claims, a court, if using the analyses 
the courts gave in Search King, Langdon, and KinderStart, would likely 
allow these claims to survive a motion to dismiss.  However, in all three of 
those cases, the “speech” attributed to Google that was being evaluated was 
always either (1) the numerical PageRank score Google assigns to websites 
or (2) the entire SERP, i.e., the ranking of websites in response to a search 
query.  It is both curious and unfortunate that there is such a wealth of 
scholarship discussing Google search engine manipulation claims, yet very 
little of that scholarship devotes any attention to discussing what the actual 
“speech” at issue is.  I propose a new theory of Google speech to raise 
attention to this paucity. 
If Google continues to face claims of search engine manipulation, as it 
likely will, it should argue that the Google speech at issue is not the 
PageRank of a website or the appearance of a SERP.  Rather, the display of 
each individual search result should be treated as an individual 
recommendation Google is making to us.  In other words, when we conduct 
Google searches, we are having a conversation with Google.  By entering 
search terms into a Google search bar, we are asking Google a question, 
such as, “What are good sushi restaurants to try?”  In response, Google 
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answers us in question format.  Each individual search result is a response 
posed in question format by Google, asking us, “Is this what you are 
looking for?”  By clicking on a search result, I am answering Google’s 
question by responding “yes, this is what I am looking for.”  I argue that by 
interpreting Google “speech” in this way, many of the legal objections to 
Google search engine manipulation will be far more difficult to allege and 
government regulation will similarly be more difficult to justify. 
I call this theory of speech the “recommendation theory,” because 
Google treats each individual search result as a recommendation by 
Google—Google is recommending websites to the user based on the user’s 
search query.  There would be no representation that the first search result 
is objectively the most relevant website, but simply a representation of 
what Google, in its own subjective opinion, would recommend to the user.  
 By adopting this recommendation theory, a plaintiff can no longer 
argue that Google is unfairly prioritizing allegedly less relevant websites 
(Google’s own websites) over competitor’s websites because there is a new 
understanding that neither PageRank nor the ranking of Google’s search 
results is purporting to represent an objective statement of fact or, as 
Professor Grimmelmann has put it, a “fact-based opinion.”  Rather, Google 
is listing websites simply in the order of what it would like to recommend, 
and recommendations cannot be treated as objective.  Google is a speaker 
that responds to our questions—our “questions” come in the form of search 
terms and Google’s “answers” come in the form of recommendations.  The 
mere fact that Google, in this sense, is a computer algorithm, as opposed to 
an actual person, cannot deny Google search the right to freedom of speech 
rights.  For example, video games can be considered “speakers” that 
“speak,” and that speech is entitled to First Amendment rights.
222
  Thus, 
while the question posed in the title of Professor Tim Wu’s New York 
Times article, Free Speech for Computers?, is humorous, it ignores the 
current state of the law—that the application of First Amendment rights to 
a speaker does not depend on whether or not that speaker is a human.
223
 
This “recommendation theory” of Google speech would allow Google 
to avoid many of the claims alleged in Search King, Langdon, and 
KinderStart, as well as Professor Grimmelman’s fact-based opinion theory.  
One could hardly argue that Google is required to recommend websites of 
its competitors.  For example, if a friend asked me to recommend a bakery 
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and my mother happens to run a bakery, I am entitled to recommend my 
mother’s bakery to my friend, and such a recommendation is not 
interpreted as an objective statement of fact that her bakery is the best.  Nor 
could such a recommendation be treated as a “fact-based opinion” capable 
of being falsified.  Similarly, Google can recommend its own proprietary 
services first by listing its vertical search engine results at the top of a 
SERP, and that should not be treated as a statement of fact that Google’s 
services are the most relevant.  Rather, it simply means that Google highly 
recommends its own services, which of course, is not unlawful.  It would 
be nonsensical to argue that recommending one’s own products and 
services would be a violation of standard business practices under any state 
law, such as the California Business and Professions Code in KinderStart.  
Therefore, the recommendation theory would allow search engines like 
Google to evade antitrust claims and deceptive business practices claims. 
Further, it would make little sense to say that Google’s failure to 
highly recommend a competitor’s website (by assigning a low PageRank to 
the website) could constitute defamation.  The mere fact that Google does 
not give a strong recommendation for one of its competitor’s products (for 
example, by assigning its competitor’s website a low PageRank or pushing 
the competitor’s website to the bottom of a SERP) could not constitute 
defamation because a failure to recommend a competitor does not 
constitute a false statement of fact.  I could hardly be liable for defamation 
of my competitor simply for failing to recommend my competitor’s product 
to the public.  Therefore, the recommendation theory would allow Google 
to escape liability for defamation claims it faces from websites suing 
Google for assigning them a low PageRank.  In sum, the recommendation 
theory would allow Google to dodge claims that Search King, Langdon, 
and KinderStart left it exposed to—antitrust, deceptive business practices, 
and defamation. 
CONCLUSION 
Search engine speech is a murky, unsettled area of law.  The Supreme 
Court has not yet adjudicated whether search engine manipulation violates 
federal antitrust laws or whether search engines are entitled to First 
Amendment protection.  Further, the recent FTC investigation failed to 
resolve the legal debate surrounding these legal issues, since very little 
evidence was publicized and little to no legal analysis was provided to 
justify the settlement.  To no surprise, Google’s opponents were unhappy 
after the settlement, accusing the FTC of missing a golden opportunity to 
enforce antitrust laws against Google.
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In this Comment, I have argued that Google search engine 
manipulation does not violate federal antitrust laws and that search engines 
like Google are entitled to First Amendment protection.  Google has the 
right to produce search results in whatever order it pleases, regardless of 
whether it is driven by innocent reasons, such as wishing to better serve the 
user, or less innocent reasons, such as wishing to boost its own products 
and services.  Although demoting the ranking of websites has the effect of 
diverting traffic away from these websites, thereby denying those websites 
potential revenue, those websites never had a right to that revenue because 
they have no right to a space on Google’s platform.  Thus, Google is not 
denying them anything they were ever entitled to. 
I have also argued that any attempt to force Google to promote its 
competitors’ websites would be compelled speech, and thus government 
regulation aimed at controlling the way in which Google ranks its search 
results would violate the First Amendment.  After analyzing cases in which 
Google raised the First Amendment as a defense against search engine 
manipulation claims, I have argued that current understandings of what 
constitutes Google “speech” for First Amendment purposes are flawed.  In 
response, I have proposed a new way of understanding Google “speech” 
through the recommendation theory, which, if adopted, will more 
adequately defend Google against the many claims it continues to face in 
court.  I hope that with this proposal, Google will be able to spend less time 
in court defending its search practices, and more time out of court doing 
what it does best:  innovating online search. 
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